Monetary economists have long recognized a tension between the bene…ts of fractional reserve banking, such as the ability to undertake more pro…table (long-term) investment opportunities, and the di¢ culties associated with fractional reserve banking, such as the risk of insolvency for each bank. The goal of this paper is to show that a speci…c form of private bank coalition (a joint-liability arrangement) allows the members of the banking system to engage in fractional reserve banking in such a way that the solvency of each member bank is completely guaranteed. Under this arrangement, I
INTRODUCTION
One of the main characteristics of the modern banking system is the small amount of reserves in lawful money that banks hold relative to the amount of short-term liabilities (such as demand deposits) they issue. Economists usually refer to this practice as fractional reserve banking. The proponents of fractional reserve banking have argued that a fractional system allows banks to economize on non-interest-bearing reserves, permitting them to increase the return on their assets and, in the case of a competitive market for bank liabilities, pay a higher return to their liability holders. Implicit in this argument is the conjecture that a lower level of reserves necessarily results in a higher return (or smaller discount) paid on a particular class of bank liabilities: those that facilitate payments and settlement (such as bank notes and demand deposits). This is usually viewed as a socially desirable outcome because one of the main functions of banks is to provide transaction services.
Fractional reserve banking is indeed a superior form of banking provided that each bank relies on an interbank market to borrow reserves in case it su¤ers an unusual number of withdrawals. The fact that each bank holds only a fraction of its demandable liabilities in the form of highly liquid assets makes it prone to failure. A typical concern is whether fractional reserve banking renders the banking system insolvent in case interbank markets, for some reason, fail to perform the function of transferring reserves from more liquid banks to illiquid banks. 1 Thus, there is a clear tension between the bene…ts of fractional reserve banking, such as the ability to undertake more pro…table (long-term) investment opportunities, and the di¢ culties associated with the implementation of fractional reserve banking, such as the risk of insolvency for each bank. The goal of this paper is to investigate whether it is possible to implement a fractional reserve system that allows member banks to take advantage of pro…table investment opportunities and that is safe and sound. My main result is to show that a speci…c form of private bank coalition (a joint-liability arrangement) allows the members of the banking system to engage in fractional reserve banking in such a way that the solvency of each individual member is completely guaranteed. As opposed to markets, this bank coalition involves the monitoring of the activities of member banks.
Finally, I argue that this kind of bank coalition resembles the clearinghouse associations that have developed in the U.S. in the 19th century, as described in Friedman and Schwartz (1963) , Gorton (1984 Gorton ( , 1985 , Gorton and Mullineaux (1987) , and Tallman (1992, 2000) .
I construct a random-matching model in which privately issued liabilities circulate as a medium of exchange. People meet in pairs and rely on bank liabilities to trade. The redemption of bank liabilities happens periodically in a centralized location where sellers who have sold goods to buyers take their bank liabilities to claim their face value. The key incentive problem within the banking system arises due to hidden action: It is necessary to provide banks with incentives to induce them to voluntarily report the creation of bank liabilities and hold the appropriate level of reserves. To deal with this incentive problem, there exists a clearinghouse association (a mechanism) that requires member banks to report their transactions, imposes reserve requirements on each one of them, and supervises the settlement and clearing of bank liabilities at each date. Thus, the kind of monitoring provided by the clearinghouse allows each member bank to issue liabilities that circulate as a medium of exchange.
I initially characterize an equilibrium allocation in the absence of a bank coalition. In this case, a safe and sound banking system (i.e., one in which there is no bank failure in equilibrium) necessarily involves an institutional arrangement in which each banker is required to hold in reserve the full value of his demandable liabilities. As should be expected, each member bank is fully solvent at any moment so that this form of banking ensures the stability of the payment system. I show that such a system costs something for nonbanks:
The rate of return paid on bank liabilities is relatively low because it is necessary to induce bankers to truthfully report the creation of bank liabilities and voluntarily hold the appropriate level of reserves. Because each consumer holds her wealth in the form of bank liabilities, the equilibrium value of these liabilities has a …rst-order e¤ect on the welfare of consumers. Thus, it is desirable to investigate the existence of an incentive-feasible scheme within the banking system that results in a higher equilibrium value of bank liabilities and that preserves the safety of bank liabilities as a means of payment (so that traders do not discount privately issued notes because of the possibility of losses due to bank failures).
In particular, I characterize the properties of a banking system in which each banker voluntarily chooses to become a member of a coalition that will issue bank liabilities that are e¤ectively joint obligations of its members. Each banker continues to issue liabilities that identify him as a debtor, but the coalition publicly announces that, in the event in which an individual banker is unable to keep his promises, other members will honor any obligation of such a member, according to their joint capacity. This joint-liability arrangement will allow member banks to reduce the share of funds invested in non-interest-bearing assets and, consequently, increase the share of funds invested in interest-bearing assets. As a result, it is possible to induce each banker to pay a higher return on bank liabilities, bene…tting the consumers who use these liabilities as a means of payment. Most important, I show that this outcome can be achieved in such a way that the stability of the banking system is preserved (i.e., no bank failure occurs on the equilibrium path) despite the implementation of fractional reserve banking. Speci…cally, I show that a joint-liability arrangement of the kind described above is an e¤ective mechanism that permits the ex post transfer of reserves from liquid banks to illiquid banks in order to ensure the solvency of each individual member bank.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 presents the basic framework. Section 4 carefully describes the exchange mechanism. In Section 5, I characterize equilibrium allocations in the case of a fully backed system. In Section 6, I discuss the welfare implications of a joint-liability arrangement. Section 7 concludes.
RELATED LITERATURE
My analysis is clearly related to the vast literature on inside money. Some prominent papers studying the properties of inside money include Roberds (1998, 1999) , Wallace (1999a, 1999b) , Williamson (1999) others. In these papers, reserve management is not the focus of the analysis, so the welfare properties of alternative reserve policies are not studied.
One prominent paper that explicitly accounts for reserve management is Cavalcanti, Erosa, and Temzelides (1999). 2 In this paper, the authors characterize an equilibrium allocation corresponding to a banking system for which regulation is weaker than 100% reserve requirements. In contrast to their work, my analysis focuses on the welfare properties of interbank arrangements as a means of better managing banking reserves. Also, my framework allows me to fully characterize the e¤ects on prices and quantities (as, in their model, prices are exogenous).
My results can also be viewed as a response to the narrow banking proposal, as described in Wallace (1996) . This author uses the Diamond-Dybvig model (see Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) to show that a banking system that issues liabilities fully backed by safe short-term assets is socially undesirable. In his concluding remarks, Wallace points out that, in reality, bank liabilities serve as a means of payment (something not captured in the Diamond-Dybvig framework) and raises some concerns about how this property would in ‡uence the conclusions. My analysis emphasizes precisely the role that bank liabilities play in facilitating transactions.
A recent paper that also studies the bene…ts of fractional reserve banking is Chari and Phelan (2012) . These authors …nd that, under some circumstances, a fully backed system is socially desirable because of the existence of a social cost (in terms of resources devoted to the banking system) associated with the private creation of government currency substitutes. In my analysis, the desirability of a fractional reserve system relies on the existence of an incentive-feasible interbank arrangement that permits member banks to transfer reserves among themselves based on their individual trading histories. In this respect, my analysis is in line with Kocherlakota (1998) and Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) , who characterize the e¤ects of di¤erent forms of recordkeeping on trading arrangements. In the case of a fully backed system, there is no need for any kind of credit arrangement among banks, so society does not take advantage of its record-keeping possibilities. Under a fractional reserve system, society bene…ts from a sophisticated credit arrangement that permits member banks to economize on non-interest-bearing reserves due to the creation of long-term credit relationships. The possibility of keeping track of trading histories within the banking sector is essential for the implementation of such an arrangement.
In my framework, a key assumption for tractability is that the clearing and settlement of bank liabilities occur in a centralized location, as in Koeppl, Monnet, Temzelides (2008) and Deviatov and Wallace (2009) . 3 The assumption that the clearing and settlement of privately issued liabilities take place periodically in a centralized location allows me to fully characterize the e¤ects of alternative reserve policies on equilibrium prices and quantities and, consequently, focus on the key incentive problem in ‡uencing the decision to hold reserves, namely, hidden action.
Finally, it is important to mention that my results have a similar ‡avor to those obtained in Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2007) in that the introduction of an interbank arrangement of the kind described above allows society to better allocate resources. In my analysis, the welfare gains come entirely from better management of banking reserves, which can only be achieved through the implementation of an incentive-feasible scheme among the members of the banking sector.
MODEL
Time t = 0; 1; 2; ::: is discrete, and the horizon is in…nite. Each period is divided into three subperiods or stages. There are two physical commodities, referred to as good x and good y, that are perfectly divisible. There are three types of agents, indexed by i = 1; 2; 3, who are in…nitely lived. There is a [0; 1] continuum of each type. Types 2 and 3 want to consume good x, whereas type 1 wants to consume good y. If good x is not properly stored in the subperiod it is produced, it will depreciate completely.
Good y is perishable and cannot be stored, so it must be consumed in the subperiod it is produced. Type 1 is able to produce good x only in the …rst subperiod. Type 2 is able to produce good y only in the second subperiod. Type 3 is unable to produce either good but has access to the technology to perfectly store good x at any moment. In the …rst subperiod, each type 3 also has access to a (divisible) investment technology that requires good x as an input and yields a …xed return > 1 (in terms of good x) only at the beginning of the following date. Finally, each type 3 has access to a technology that allows him to create, at zero cost, an indivisible and durable object, referred to as a note, that perfectly identi…es him. This means that notes issued by each type 3 are perfectly distinguishable from those issued by other people so that counterfeiting will not be a problem.
I now explicitly describe preferences. Let x t 2 f0; 1g denote type 1's production of good x at date t, and let y t 2 R + denote his consumption of good y at date t. Type 1's preferences are represented by u (y t )
x t , where 2 R + , and u : R + ! R is continuously di¤erentiable, increasing, and strictly concave, with u (0) = 0 and u 0 (0) = 1. We assume the production technology of good x allows type 1 to produce either zero or one unit of good x at each date, even though good
x is perfectly divisible.
Let y t 2 R + denote type 2's production of good y at date t, and let x t 2 R + denote his consumption of good x at date t. Type 2's preferences are represented by
where ! 2 R + , and v : R + ! R is continuously di¤erentiable, increasing, and concave, with v (0) = 0. Type 3 derives utility x t if his consumption of good x at date t is x t 2 R + .
Finally, let 2 (0; 1) denote the common discount factor over periods. I assume < 1 .
In each subperiod, there is a distinct round of interactions. In the …rst subperiod, each type 1 is randomly matched with a type 3. In the second subperiod, each type 1 is randomly matched with a type 2 with probability 2 (0; 1). In the third subperiod, all type 2 and all type 3 meet in a centralized location.
EXCHANGE MECHANISM
To describe the exchange process, it is convenient to refer to type 1 as a buyer, to type 2 as a seller, and to type 3 as a banker. To better understand these labels, it is easier to start with the second stage. In this stage, each buyer is randomly matched with a seller with probability . Because the buyer wants good y but is unable to produce good x for the seller at that time, the pair will be able to trade only if a medium of exchange is made available.
As will become clear, each banker will be able to provide such a medium of exchange in the form of personal liabilities redeemable on demand. I refer to these tradable liabilities as notes. Thus, the objects that a buyer and a seller trade are good y and notes.
Each buyer will be able to acquire a note in the …rst stage when each one of them is randomly matched with a banker. In this stage, each buyer has access to the technology to produce good x, so the objects a buyer and a banker trade are good x and notes. Finally, in the third stage, all sellers and all bankers interact in a centralized location. In this stage, each merchant has an opportunity to redeem any note (i.e., converting a privately issued liability into good x) he has received from a consumer (if any) in the previous stage, so we can think of this stage as the settlement stage. Thus, two objects can be traded: good x and notes. Note that no production takes place during the settlement stage.
Let me now describe the information structure of this economy. Each banker is able to observe the actions of other bankers in the centralized location. In the …rst and second stages, the bilateral trades are privately observable, i.e., only the pair of agents participating in the meeting knows the amounts traded. Now I explain how each banker will be able to issue private liabilities that circulate as a medium of exchange. There exists a clearinghouse association that is designed to coordinate the actions of member banks. Each banker can be a member of the clearinghouse at no cost but has to follow its rules. The clearinghouse requires that each banker reports any meeting in the …rst stage in which a note has been issued, keeping track of individual issuance of notes. For each note issued, the banker is required to store a fraction of the face value of the note (in terms of good x), to be interpreted as reserves backing the issuance of his note.
Any banker who fails to redeem a note on demand (in the settlement stage) will have his membership permanently revoked (i.e., a banker who reneges on his promises will lose his monitoring privileges). Any banker who fails to report the issuance of a note will also permanently lose his membership. Note that his deviation will be publicly observable to the members of the clearinghouse only when someone presents such a note for redemption in the settlement stage, which may take several periods to happen.
I assume that, once a banker has reported the creation of a note and has set aside the appropriate amount of reserves, he will not be able to act opportunistically by subsequently consuming the amount of good x he has previously reported as reserves backing his liabilities. The only moment in which the banker can opportunistically consume any amount of good x he has received from someone is before reporting the creation of a note to the clearinghouse. Thus, I can say that each banker is required to "deposit" reserves with the clearinghouse association every time he announces the creation of a bank liability so that he cannot opportunistically access his reserves in future periods. Precisely, I assume that, after meeting with buyers bilaterally in the …rst subperiod, all bankers get together in the centralized location to deposit reserves and, perhaps, invest in the productive technology.
Recall that the productive technology requires that a banker invest some amount of good x in the …rst subperiod to obtain a return in the following period. Note also that sellers arrive at the centralized location only in the third subperiod so that they do not observe the amounts deposited by each banker. See Figure 1 for a sequence of events within each period.
It is important to mention that the acceptability of privately issued notes is endogenously determined in the model. A seller's decision to accept a note issued by a banker in exchange for his output (good y) is based on the available information he has about the issuer. In my framework, the available information for each seller is the record of redemptions for each individual banker through the clearinghouse. There can be other mechanisms that permit the e¤ective circulation of privately issued notes. In this paper, I restrict attention to a mechanism that requires member banks to report the creation of bank liabilities and deposit reserves in order to deal with the incentive problems.
Finally, I assume that each agent can carry at most one indivisible unit of money at any moment. This means that individual note holdings are restricted to the set f0; 1g. In this respect, the model developed in this paper relates to the second generation of searchtheoretic models of monetary exchange, following the ideas in Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995) . On the other hand, there is no restriction on the number of notes that each banker is allowed to issue at any moment except for that imposed by the matching technology. This means that the number of notes issued by any banker belongs to the set f0; 1; 2; :::g.
FULLY BACKED SYSTEM
In this section, I characterize an equilibrium allocation in case the members of the clearinghouse decide not to engage in any sort of credit or insurance scheme. Thus, to guarantee the solvency of each member bank, the clearinghouse will require that each banker keeps in reserve the full face value of any note he has issued. In other words, each member will have to adopt a 100% reserve policy in order to retain his membership.
Equilibrium
Throughout the paper, I restrict attention to equilibria for which there exist an invariant One key feature of the model that renders it highly tractable is that one does not need to keep track of each banker's individual history of note creation and note redemption. In particular, I restrict attention to symmetric equilibria in which the notes issued by any pair of bankers will be treated equally across di¤erent matches. Thus, all that matters for the characterization of equilibrium is the aggregate amount of privately issued notes in circulation outside the banking sector.
Let me start by describing the Bellman equations for each buyer. Let V 0 denote the beginning-of-period expected discounted utility of a buyer not holding a note, and let V 1 denote the beginning-of-period expected discounted utility of a buyer holding a note. The
Bellman equations for a buyer are given by
Here y 2 R + denotes the quantity of good y that he will be able to purchase from the seller with whom he is matched in exchange for a note, and 2 [0; 1] denotes the probability that the seller will accept a privately issued note in exchange for his output.
If the buyer starts the period without a note, then he will be able to obtain one from the banker with whom he is currently matched, in which case he will produce one unit of good x. A newly issued note costs one unit of good x and is a promise to pay 2 [0; 1] unit of good x on demand to the note holder. Then, with probability , the buyer will be matched with a seller in the second stage, in which case the buyer will be able to consume y 2 R + units of good y with probability (and will enter the following period without a note). With probability 1
, the buyer will not trade in the second stage and will hold on to his note.
Each buyer is able to save in the form of liabilities issued by bankers (a store of value)
until he has an opportunity to consume. Recall that, by assumption, each buyer will not be able to produce again until he has an opportunity to spend his current note holdings. This means that the buyer's wealth is completely determined by the equilibrium value of bank liabilities.
Let W 0 denote the expected discounted utility of a seller who is currently matched with a buyer not holding a note in the second stage, and let W 1 denote the expected discounted utility of a seller who is currently matched with a buyer holding a note. In a stationary equilibrium, the Bellman equations for a seller are given by
I have implicitly assumed that the banker will voluntarily deposit the face value of each note issued so that by accepting a banker's note in trade a seller receives . Below I carefully discuss the incentive problem. Now consider the Bellman equations for each banker. Let J 0 denote the expected discounted utility of a banker who is currently matched with a buyer not holding a note in the …rst stage, and let J 1 denote the expected discounted utility of a banker who is currently matched with a buyer holding a note. For each note issued in the …rst stage, the banker will be required to set aside the amount 2 [0; 1] in order to meet his future obligations.
In a stationary equilibrium, the Bellman equations for a banker are given by
Note that a banker who has issued a note (and who has truthfully reported it to the clearinghouse) is able to immediately consume the amount 1 of good x. The consumption decision is trivial: The banker will save exactly the required amount because < 1 .
As I have previously mentioned, the expected discounted utility of each banker does not depend on the number of notes he has previously issued. On the equilibrium path, each banker is willing to deposit with the clearinghouse the amount for each note issued so that he can immediately consume 1 every time he issues a note. Because the clearinghouse will ensure the solvency of each individual member in this case or in any other case considered in this paper, the number of notes outstanding for each banker will not in ‡uence his probability of failure. In particular, the probability of failure will be zero because the clearinghouse either requires each member to deposit the full face value of each note or ensures the ex post transfer of reserves from liquid banks to illiquid banks.
A banker who meets a buyer holding a note can o¤er his own note in exchange for the buyer's note. In this case, the banker can claim the face value of someone else's note only if he reports the acquisition of such a note to the clearinghouse, in which case the clearinghouse will require him to hold reserves due to the issuance of his own note. Thus, such a trade will bring no extra bene…t to the banker unless the buyer gives him some extra amount of good x together with his note. But, in this case, the buyer will clearly be better o¤ by holding on to his (previously acquired) note. Thus, a swap of notes happens if and only if both agents are indi¤erent. For simplicity, I assume that both choose not to swap notes in this case. 4 The terms of trade in the …rst and second stages are determined as follows. Start with the second stage. I assume that the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the seller, in which case he will be able to capture all surplus from trade. Suppose that the seller accepts privately issued notes with probability one, i.e., = 1. (Below I discuss the decision to accept notes.) In a bilateral meeting, the buyer's surplus from trade is given by
and the seller's surplus from trade is simply given by
The buyer is willing to make any o¤er such that u (y) 0, and the seller accepts the buyer's o¤er if and only if
This participation constraint will always bind in the case in which the buyer has all the bargaining power, so the quantity of good y produced in each bilateral meeting will be given by
Consider now the terms of trade in the …rst stage. In a trade meeting, the buyer's participation constraint is given by
Using (1) and (2), we can rewrite this participation constraint as follows:
The banker's participation constraint is given by
which simply requires
This means that an equilibrium value must satisfy both (8) and (9) .
To construct an equilibrium, we have to keep in mind that each banker has the option of not reporting his newly issued note to the clearinghouse. The punishment for failing to report any newly issued note (and setting aside the required amount of reserves) is the immediate termination of his membership when his deviation is detected. Thus, each banker truthfully reports the creation of a new note in the …rst stage if and only if
where J d denotes the value associated with his best deviation. The left-hand side gives the banker's expected discounted utility in case he chooses to truthfully report the creation of a note. The right-hand side gives his expected discounted utility in case he adopts his best deviation. This means that each banker is willing to deposit with the clearinghouse the full face value of each note he has issued provided that the equilibrium value of bank liabilities is such that his expected discounted utility is at least the same as that he would obtain by adopting his best deviation strategy. His best deviation strategy may involve issuing some notes without holding the appropriate amount of reserves, i.e., engaging in fractional reserve banking.
My …rst step is to show that the value of deviation is bounded below by 1 and is bounded above by (1 + )
, regardless of the required deposit amount . To verify that J d 1, notice that a banker who decides to deviate at any given date is able to immediately consume one unit of good x. His decision to not deposit reserves with the clearinghouse will certainly a¤ect his continuation value. But, in any case, his continuation value is at least zero. Thus, I have shown that J d 1. To show that J d has an upper bound, consider the hypothetical case in which a banker who has deviated at some date t is able to deviate at each subsequent date without increasing his probability of failure (for instance, because each note holder will freely dispose of his notes). In this case, the maximum expected discounted utility he can obtain is given by
where the value J 0 satis…es
When he initially deviates at some date t, he is able to immediately consume one unit of good x. He will be able to continue trading only with probability 1 , which is precisely the probability that the buyer who has acquired his note does not …nd a trading partner in the second stage. If his deviation is not detected at date t, he will be able to issue a new note at date t + 1 with probability . After date t, his probability of failure will not increase (despite the fact that more than one note has been issued without the corresponding amount of reserves) because I have assumed that whoever acquires his notes after date t will freely dispose of them so that his probability of survival continues to be given by 1 at the end of each date. It is straightforward to show that
Thus, the value associated with his best deviation J d is indeed bounded:
As I have previously mentioned, a banker's best deviation strategy may involve issuing some notes without holding the appropriate amount of reserves, which will increase his individual probability of failure. To illustrate this point, consider a deviation strategy (not necessarily his best deviation) in which a banker decides to issue notes without holding reserves. If he chooses not to report a newly issued note, he can immediately consume the amount of good x he has received in exchange for his note. With probability 1 , his deviation will remain undetected, in which case he will be able to issue a new note in the following period with probability . With probability (1 ) 2 , his deviation will remain undetected in the following period (now two of his notes are in circulation), in which case he will be able to issue a third note in the subsequent period with probability . Note that his probability of failure increases over time. As long as his deviation remains undetected, he will be able to continue to issue notes without reporting their existence to the clearinghouse, immediately consuming the proceeds from the sale of these notes. The expected discounted utility associated with this deviation strategy is given bŷ
where, for each i = 1; 2; 3; :::, we havê
This strategy is likely to be his best deviation strategy when is relatively low, which means that his defection will be detected only with a small probability, and the discount factor is low. Even though a banker's best deviation strategy may not be unique, there exists a unique value J d in the interval given by (11) that corresponds to the maximum value associated with a best deviation strategy.
To guarantee that each banker voluntarily participates in the clearinghouse, it is necessary to make membership su¢ ciently pro…table such that his expected discounted utility is larger than that associated with his best deviation. The truth-telling constraint (10) guarantees that each individual banker holds enough reserves to pay the full face value of each outstanding note. Thus, it is individually rational for each seller to choose = 1 (i.e., to accept privately issued notes with probability one) provided that (10) is satis…ed.
Recall that the seller observes the face value associated with a note and the record of past redemptions by each individual banker through the clearinghouse. When the value is such that (10) is satis…ed, each seller knows that the members of the clearinghouse are willing to deposit the required amount of reserves for each note issued. Thus, he is willing to accept a note issued by a member bank with probability one.
In equilibrium, I require that (10) holds with equality, which will allow me to obtain the highest equilibrium value of bank liabilities consistent with truthful reporting. In section 6, I provide an interpretation for this particular choice and discuss the implications of alternative regimes.
Finally, note that the participation constraints (8) and (9) impose both a minimum and a maximum value of notes consistent with equilibrium:
The minimum value arises due to the buyer's participation constraint, whereas the maximum value arises due to the banker's participation constraint. Given these requirements, it is now straightforward to formally de…ne a stationary equilibrium. (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (10) with equality, and (12). In addition, J d is the value associated with a banker's best deviation strategy when each banker is required to deposit with the clearinghouse the amount , contingent on the creation of a note.
Note that I have not included in the de…nition above the distribution of outstanding notes across the population of bankers. 5 As I have previously mentioned, all that matters for the determination of an equilibrium allocation is the aggregate amount of privately issued notes in circulation outside the banking sector.
In a stationary equilibrium, at each date, a fraction of bankers issue a note in the …rst stage, so the total volume of reserves increases by the amount (in terms of good x).
In the third stage, a fraction of all outstanding notes is retired, so the total volume of reserves decreases by . This means that the total volume of reserves at the end of the period is exactly the same as the volume at the beginning of the period in the case of a stationary equilibrium.
Under this assumption, I can formally show the existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Provided that ! is su¢ ciently small, there exists a unique stationary monetary equilibrium in which the value of notes is given by
In this equilibrium, the end-of-period excess reserves are given by (1 ) at each date. Combining (5) with (10), we obtain
Using (6) and (14), we …nd
Replacing (14) and (15) into (5), we obtain the value shown in (13), which is the unique solution. The amount of good y produced and traded in each bilateral meeting in the second stage is given by
Using (1) and (2), we obtain the values V 0 and V 1 :
Because of the assumption that the buyer has all bargaining power when trading with a seller, it follows that W 0 = W 1 = 0.
Now we need to verify whether satis…es (12) . Under Assumption 1, it is straightforward to show that satis…es (12) provided that ! is su¢ ciently small (i.e., each seller is su¢ ciently productive).
Finally, I need to show that the end-of-period excess reserves are (1 ) . First, note that, at the end of each date, all sellers who have acquired a note are able to convert it into unit of good x. Note also that there is no reason for them to delay the redemption of a note. Because m 1 = 1 in a stationary equilibrium and note holdings are constrained to the set f0; 1g, the total volume of reserves at the end of the …rst stage must be . Because m 2 = , the total volume of reserves decreases by the amount at the end of the third stage. This means that the end-of-period volume of excess reserves is (1 ) .
In a stationary equilibrium, each banker consumes 1 unit of good x when he has an opportunity to issue a note, each buyer consumes ! 1 v units of good y when he has an opportunity to trade with a seller and produces one unit of good x when he acquires a note, and each seller produces ! 1 v units of good y and consumes unit of good x when he has an opportunity to trade with a buyer.
Note that a sound banking system of the kind described in this section costs something for nonbanks. As I have shown, the equilibrium value is determined in such a way that each banker obtains a ‡ow of income derived from the note-issuing privileges that is su¢ cient to induce him to deposit reserves to fully back his demandable liabilities. As a result, no banker invests in the productive technology in the case of a fully backed system. The requirement of depositing the full face value of each note with the clearinghouse in the form of non-interest-bearing assets (storage) is imposed to guarantee the solvency of each individual banker. When each individual banker follows this policy, the banking system as a whole holds excess reserves at the end of each period. In the next section, I consider an institutional arrangement that allows the members of the banking system to invest at least some of their funds in the productive technology and that guarantees the solvency of each individual banker. Thus, such an arrangement will promote e¢ ciency without compromising stability.
FRACTIONAL RESERVE SYSTEM
The goal of this section is to characterize an incentive-feasible arrangement within the banking sector that preserves the stability of the banking system but permits the members of society to achieve a better allocation of resources by taking advantage of more pro…table investment opportunities. Suppose now that, at the beginning of date zero, the members of the clearinghouse association agree to issue notes that are e¤ectively joint obligations of its members. Each banker continues to issue notes that identify him as a debtor, but the clearinghouse publicly announces that, in the event that an individual banker is unable to redeem his own notes, other members will honor any obligation of such a member, according to their joint capacity. Under this arrangement, each banker is entitled to use other bankers' reserves to meet his own obligations in case he is called for redemption provided that he is willing to pledge his own reserves to redeem the notes issued by other bankers in case they need them.
The clearinghouse is responsible for supervising the required deposit amounts by the members of the coalition. When dealing with each individual member, the clearinghouse needs to induce him to truthfully report the issuance of notes and voluntarily deposit the appropriate amount of resources, which is the same as saying that it needs to ensure that the truth-telling constraint (10) is satis…ed. The clearinghouse will also determine the amounts to be invested in storage and in the productive technology, which will form the portfolio of the coalition. Initially, each individual banker has an equal claim on the current and future assets of the bank coalition. However, depending on his individual history of note creation and note redemption, the banker may be a creditor or a debtor within the coalition, in which case his claim on the current and future assets of the coalition may increase or decrease over time.
The main di¤erence from the previous case is that now the relevant measure to determine the solvency of each banker who is called for redemption at each date is the ratio of the value of all reserves of the coalition to the value of all notes that are presented for redemption.
Because the members of the coalition know that not all outstanding notes will be presented for redemption at each date, it is possible to invest at least some fraction of the funds in the productive technology to obtain a higher rate of return provided that each member is willing to deposit the appropriate amount of resources with the clearinghouse, which means that he is willing to engage in a joint-liability arrangement.
Equilibrium
Suppose that each buyer starts date zero without any note. Thus, at date zero, each banker has an opportunity to issue a note to the buyer with whom he is initially matched.
Suppose initially the clearinghouse determines that each banker is required to save the same amount (to be deposited with the clearinghouse) as that observed in the previous case (i.e., the amount ) so that (10) continues to hold with equality. This means that the total amount of good x that all bankers set aside at date zero is given by . Suppose that the aggregate amount invested in the productive technology at date zero and at any other subsequent date is given by (1 ) .
Under this investment policy, the amount of good x that will be available for the members of the clearinghouse at the beginning of each date t 1 is at least (1 ) . Given that, after date zero, the aggregate amount of good x that all bankers set aside is given by , the total amount of good x available for investing in either the storage technology or the productive technology is given by at each date. Because a fraction of all notes in circulation will be retired in the settlement stage, this means that the equilibrium value of notes is now given
in case the clearinghouse follows the investment policy described above. The equilibrium value (17) is determined by aggregate feasibility in case the members of the clearinghouse agree to engage in the joint-liability arrangement described above, and the clearinghouse follows the policy of investing the amount (16) in the productive technology at each date.
This means that the consumption of each buyer who …nds a trading partner will be given by This means that the banking system as a whole is holding in reserve only a fraction of the aggregate value of bank liabilities. The members of the clearinghouse know that not all notes in circulation will be presented for redemption at the end of each date, so by creating a mechanism for pooling reserves to avoid individual insolvency, it is possible to reduce the amount of non-interest-bearing assets in the system and, consequently, increase the amount of interest-bearing assets held by the coalition. This enhanced management of reserves allows the banking system to pay a higher return on bank liabilities. Note that the banking system as a whole always has enough reserves to retire all notes that are presented for redemption at the end of each date, so it is completely solvent by construction. Each individual banker may not have enough reserves to retire his own notes at a particular date but is able to use other bankers'reserves to ful…ll his promises.
In the case described above, each banker remained indi¤erent between adopting a jointliability scheme and operating under a fully backed system, which implied that all welfare gains went entirely to buyers. This relies on the choice of a particular trading mechanism that requires the truth-telling constraint to hold with equality at each date. Alternatively, I can construct an equilibrium in which all welfare gains go entirely to bankers. In this case, the equilibrium value of notes continues to be given by so that each buyer remains indi¤erent. This means that, given the policy of investing the amount (16) Because 00 < , the left-hand side of the truth-telling constraint (10) Note that, in this case, each banker strictly prefers to be a member of a clearinghouse association that initially agrees to issue liabilities that are joint obligations of its members and follows the investment policy described above, which renders the scheme incentive compatible. Not only is the joint-liability arrangement described above an e¤ective mechanism to ensure the solvency of each individual banker, but it also makes the construction of a higher-yielding portfolio for the bank coalition feasible. By providing a mechanism that permits member banks that are called for redemption to use the reserves of banks that have idle balances, a joint-liability arrangement makes it possible to invest some of the aggregate resources of the coalition in the productive technology, increasing the return obtained on banking assets.
It is important to mention once again that the stability of the system (i.e., the fact that there is no bank failure in equilibrium) can only be achieved by promising a su¢ ciently high expected discounted utility to each banker, which is necessary to induce him to truthfully report the creation of bank liabilities and voluntarily deposit reserves with the clearinghouse.
This means that there exists an endogenously determined upper bound on the return each banker is willing to pay on his liabilities (i.e., the stability of the banking system costs something for nonbanks). The fact that bankers engage in a joint-liability arrangement of the kind described above permits us to raise this upper bound due to a more e¢ cient use of interbank deposits.
Discussion
It is important to provide some interpretations of the kind of exchange mechanism I have described in this paper. It is possible to interpret the clearinghouse in my model as the kind of private bank coalition that was formed in the United States prior to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System. For instance, Gorton (1984 Gorton ( , 1985 and Gorton and Mullineaux (1987) have provided evidence that the clearinghouse associations that were formed in some cities in the United States (e.g., New York, Boston, and Chicago) in the second half of the 19th century evolved into a coalition of banks that required each member bank to report its transactions, imposed reserve requirements on each member bank, and supervised the settlement process on a daily basis. In this case, the adoption of a fractional reserve system can be interpreted as a mechanism to induce cooperation within the members of the clearinghouse so that the system as whole can reduce the share of funds invested in non-interest-bearing reserves and, consequently, increase the share of funds invested in interest-bearing assets.
Under this interpretation, the kind of interbank arrangement described in the previous section resembles the issuance of loan certi…cates by the members of the clearinghouse, which was one of the main …nancial innovations of clearinghouse associations. These certi…cates were issued by member banks to settle transactions with other members of the clearinghouse as part of the note-clearing process, in which case the clearinghouse association required the deposit of a certain class of assets to secure the creation of loan certi…cates. The main implication of this kind of …nancial innovation was the reduction in non-interestbearing reserves (such as gold) that member banks had to hold in order to settle interbank transactions. In my framework, I can say that a banker who does not have enough reserves to retire his notes at any date is allowed to borrow from other bankers by issuing a loan certi…cate, which will guarantee the full convertibility of his notes. Each individual banker will be entitled to issue loan certi…cates provided that, when he happens to hold excess reserves, he is also willing to pledge his own reserves to other bankers who need reserves to pay note holders.
Before I conclude, it is important to discuss the welfare properties of at least another obvious monetary arrangement: An equilibrium in which all trades are carried out with outside …at money. In the Appendix, I show that the stationary allocation under a fully backed system can also be implemented with …at money (in the absence of a clearinghouse), but the stationary allocation under a fractional reserve system cannot be reproduced in an economy where …at money is the only available medium of exchange. This result arises because the adoption of a fractional reserve system involves a relatively sophisticated interbank arrangement that cannot be implemented with …at money. This is in line with the results in Kocherlakota (1998) , who argues that …at money works as an imperfect form of memory in the sense that the set of allocations that can be implemented with memory (i.e., perfect knowledge of trading histories) is larger than the set of allocations that can be implemented with …at money.
CONCLUSION
This paper has emphasized the welfare properties of a speci…c type of bank coalition: a joint-liability arrangement. As opposed to markets, this form of bank coalition involves the monitoring of the activities of member banks. I have shown that this form of banking organization o¤ers an e¤ective response to a well-known tension between the bene…ts of fractional reserve banking and the risks associated with it. In particular, I have demonstrated that it is possible to allow member banks to take advantage of pro…table (long-term) investment opportunities without compromising the stability of the banking system. The bank coalition described above ensures the transfer of reserves from more liquid banks to illiquid banks despite the existence of incentive problems. As a result, it is possible to increase the share of funds invested in interest-bearing assets, raising the rate of return obtained on banking assets. The way to achieve this goal without compromising the stability of the banking system is to ensure that the value attached to participation in the bank coalition is su¢ ciently high so that each member bank voluntarily holds the required amount of reserves. Thus, a joint-liability arrangement of the kind described above is a welfareimproving mechanism that allows the members of society to achieve a better allocation of resources (a truly superior form of banking).
Finally, it is important to mention that the model developed in this paper can be easily applied to the study of other issues in the …eld of money and banking. For instance, Sanches The equilibrium value of money in this market will be .
It is straightforward to show that such an equilibrium exists if and only if
This condition guarantees that, after trading in the …rst market, each type 3 …nds it optimal to store the amount of good x in order to sell it on the third market in exchange for one unit of money. Note also that a type 3 holding money in the third market could exchange his note for unit of good x. In this case, his best deviation would be to immediately consume it. However, condition (18) also guarantees that he will be better o¤ by holding on to his note.
In this equilibrium, note that each type 3 acts as a "currency trader" in the sense that he buys and sells currency on a regular basis, making a pro…t from these activities.
Finally, to show that the stationary equilibrium allocation in the case of a fractional reserve system cannot be implemented with …at money, it is su¢ cient to examine the budget constraint of each individual banker (type 3). In the case of a fractional reserve system, I have shown that it is possible to keep each banker's consumption unchanged and, simultaneously, increase the value of privately issued notes. This is possible because the transfer scheme adopted in the centralized location allows the clearinghouse to "aggregate" the individual budget constraints, reducing the amount of excess reserves in the system. In the case of …at money, each banker has to save the full amount in order to buy back one unit of …at money in the third stage, so that he can continue trading in future periods.
Thus, there is no aggregation of individual budget constraints. Therefore, the allocation obtained under a fractional reserve system cannot be reproduced in case …at money is the only available medium of exchange. 
